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11 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective of the dissertation and main legal questions
What is the main goal of this dissertation? Its purpose is to compare and analyze principles, 
rules and case law applicable to time charter indemnity provisions in situations where the 
shipowner incurs greater liability for bills of lading inconsistent with charterparty terms, un-
der Norwegian and English law. This is an issue that has been discussed for many years and 
still preserves its classic importance.1 In practice, indemnity claims between shipowners and 
charterers are brought to court or arbitration regularly. 
In addition, this dissertation aims to contribute to the analysis of the following legal ques-
tions:
                                                
1 Jens Vogth-Erikse, ‘Regress I certepartiforhold’, MarIus no. 53 (1980); Haakon Stang Lund, 
‘Regress mellom partene i certepartier og fraktkontrakter’, I Lov, dom og bok, Festskrift til 
Sjur Brækhus (Universitetsforlaget 1988); Susanne Moshuus, ‘Lasteansvar I tidsbefrakt-
ningsforhold’, MarIus no. 193 (1992); Trond Solvang, ‘Bills of lading issued under voyage 
charterparties: review of legal position under English and Scandinavian law – practical advice 
on how to secure shipowners’ right of indemnity from charterers for liabilities incurred under 
bills of lading’ in Nordisk Medlemsbladet (2003); David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Char-
ters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Relating to time Charters (Informa 2008); Qian 
Dong, ‘Shipowner’s liability towards the third party: with focus on bills of lading and char-
terparties’, (Masteroppgave University of Oslo 2009); Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & 
Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universi-
tetsforlaget 2011), p. 413, 449; Trond Solvang, ‘The English doctrine of indemnity for com-
pliance with time charterers’ orders – does it exist under Norwegian law?’, MarIus n. 419 
(2012).
21) How indemnities have been understood in time charters under Norwegian and English 
law?
2) Whether or not solutions on indemnities in time charters would be similar in Norway and 
England, in situations where the shipowner incurs greater liability for bills of lading in-
consistent with charterparty terms.
1.2 Legal systems
This thesis will examine indemnities in time charters in two legal systems, i.e. Norwegian and 
English. 
Norway may be defined as a Northern-European civil law country with its legal system based 
on the European codification model dominant at the time the 1814 Constitution was drafted. 
However, there is no complete and organic codification of private law.2 In its uniqueness, 
Norway claims to have adopted similar but not equal legal rules together with other Nordic 
countries in some areas of law. This is reflected in the importance of case law in the maritime 
context.3 The Helsinki Treaty is also a conspicuous example of the high level of co-operation 
in the legislative area among Nordic Countries where legal uniformity is aimed in civil, crim-
                                                
2 Article 94 of the 1814 Norwegian Constitution
<http://stortinget.no/en/In-English/About-the-Storting/The-Constitution/The-Constitution/> 
Accessed 19.06.2013
3 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The 
Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011), p. 31. The authors of this text-
book expressed the view that in the context of the Maritime Code, it is common to cite the 
most significant judicial decisions from other Scandinavian countries “[…] in support of a 
particular interpretation […]”. Since 1900 there is a “[…] common compilation of case re-
ports ‘Nordiske Domme i Sjøfartsanliggender’ (ND) (i.e. Scandinavian Maritime Decisions) 
published by Nordisk Defence Club […]” Furthermore, Nordic Countries have a long-
standing tradition when it comes to give uniformity to their maritime legislation, e.g. the 1893 
Code.
3inal and any other appropriate legislation.4 The Helsinki Treaty was signed between Denmark 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and aims “[…] to promote and strengthen the close ties 
existing between the Nordic peoples in matters of culture, and of legal and social philosophy, 
and to extend the scale of co-operation between the Nordic countries […] to attain uniformity 
of regulation throughout the Nordic countries in as many respects as possible.”5
England is the birthplace of the common law legal system.6 Geographically, it comprises 
England and Wales.7 Nonetheless, common law is also a term that “[…] may refer to a legal 
tradition which defines the English legal system and other derivative legal systems as op-
posed to the civilian legal tradition exemplified by the systems of mainland Europe.”8 Com-
mon law system covers a method in which law and principles are developed by judges based 
on the stare decisis principle (judicial precedent). Furthermore, the body of judgments is also 
called common law.
In Norway, statutory sources and preparatory works play a central role compared to English 
                                                
4 The Helsinki Treaty was signed on 23 March 1962 and entered into force on 1 July 1962 
<http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/agreements/treaties-and-
agreements/basic-agreement/the-helsinki-treaty> Accessed 29.08.2013
5 See Preamble of The Helsinki Treaty <http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-
operation/agreements/treaties-and-agreements/basic-agreement/the-helsinki-treaty > Ac-
cessed 29.08.2013
6 Cownie, Fiona, Anthony Bradney & Mandy Burton, English Legal System in Context (Ox-
ford University Press 2007) p. 1.
7 Wilson, Steve, Rebecca Mitchell, Tony Storey & Natalie Wortley, English Legal System 
Directions (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4 
<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199592241_chapter1.pdf > Accessed 
20.06.2013
8 Wilson, Steve, Rebecca Mitchell, Tony Storey & Natalie Wortley, English Legal System 
Directions (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 6 
<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199592241_chapter1.pdf > Accessed 
20.06.2013
4law. Nonetheless, under Norwegian law, judges may consider previous case law in support of 
their decisions. However, authority of prior judicial decisions does not oblige them in the 
same manner as under English law. 
Furthermore, contract terms under English law have great importance. English law analyses 
how terms are included in the contract, their construction, if the contract contains implied 
terms and whether there should be control over terms, e.g. unfair terms. In Norway contrac-
tual terms are also very relevant. Norwegian law also analyzes the intention of the parties as 
well as whether there should be control over terms of the contract (mandatory rules) and 
whether statutory sources should fill any gaps in the contract (supplementary rules).
1.3 Role of indemnity provisions in charterparties
Indemnity provisions enable one of the parties of a charterparty to seek compensation towards 
the other party for liabilities, losses or costs incurred by the first. These provisions are present 
both in voyage and time charters.9 Furthermore, indemnity clauses generally work in connec-
tion with an exclusion of liability clause. An exclusion clause aims to remove liability and an 
indemnity clause imposes an obligation to cover liabilities or expenses. Then, if a charterparty 
contains both an exclusion clause and indemnity, shipowners may find appropriate protection
against certain liability situations. 
A time charter is “[…] a contract under which fully manned and equipped ship’s capacity is 
made available to a time charterer for a specified period.”10 Time charters have been also de-
fined in the Norwegian Maritime Code Section 321, second paragraph, as the chartering 
                                                
9 Cf. Sections 338, 381 and 382 of the Maritime Code. 
10 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The 
Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011), p. 417.
5where remuneration is calculated “per unit of time”. Furthermore, parties to a time charterpar-
ty usually use international standard forms. 
In time chartering, indemnity is a core element of the contract due to the functions that the 
parties play. The purpose of an indemnity provision is to balance the allocation of risks aris-
ing from these functions. For example, expenditures and liability in connection with the “[…] 
commercial operation of the vessel, including liability for the cargo, are for the account of the 
time charterer […]”11 including other liability that can be attributed to the crew of the vessel. 
On the other hand, the shipowner, under a time charter, assumes the nautical and technical 
management of the ship. Therefore, costs and liability arising from performing these func-
tions shall be assumed by the shipowner.
Under a time charter the property of the vessel remains with the shipowner and solely the use 
of the vessel that has been placed at the charterer’s disposal is transferred to him temporarily. 
Thus, the charterer will order the master of the vessel to perform voyages and load and unload 
cargoes. The charterer will have these rights for a period of time and subject to payment of 
hire to the owner, in accordance with specific terms of the time charter. In economic terms, 
what happens is that the charterer generally assumes the variable costs flowing from the con-
tract12, and fixed costs are to be borne by the shipowner.13 Differences between the specific 
functions of the parties in a voyage or time charter may impact the construction of indemni-
ties. 
                                                
11 See ND 1979.364 NV (Jobst Oldebdorff); see the English translation in Maritime Law Case 
Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 
2001, p. 32.
12 Baltime Clause 4, lines 48-71 and Clause 5, lines 72-79; NYPE Clause 7, lines 84-94; 
Shelltime Clause 7, lines 97-103; see also Norwegian Maritime Code Section 387.
13 Baltime Clause 3, lines 37-47; NYPE Clause 6, lines 78-82; Shelltime Clause 6, lines 87-
96.
6In voyage charters the functions of the parties are slightly different. The shipowner transports
cargo for remuneration calculated per voyage, i.e. from port A to port B, pursuant to Maritime 
Code Section 321, second paragraph, and per cargo quantity.14 Thus, parties to a voyage char-
ter assume other costs and liabilities when compared to those assumed under a time charter.15
Indemnity may be confused with a situation of damages due to breach of contract. Indemni-
ties are in fact based on the compliance of orders from the charterer. Breach of contract is 
based on non-compliance of contractual terms. However, the implications are similar. Early 
English case law did not distinguish clearly between indemnities and breach of contract. This 
will be further developed in Chapter 2. 
As for liabilities incurred by the shipowner towards third parties, one has to bear in mind that 
in charter trade there will be, on the one hand, a chartering agreement between the shipowner 
and the charterer. On the other hand, the shipowner will enter into contracts of carriage with 
cargo owners when performing his transportation obligations under the charter and the shi-
powner or his master will sign or accept bills of lading complying with charterer’s instruc-
tions. There will be a sort of double regulation situation that may create frictions between the 
charterparty and contracts of carriage (evidenced by bills of lading and subject to mandatory 
rules pursuant to Chapter 13 of the 1994 Maritime Code). Thus, in charterparty trade, indem-
nities find their origin in the lack of coordination of liability provisions between charters and 
bills of lading and/or waybills.
1.4 Freedom of contract in charterparties under Norwegian law
                                                
14 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The 
Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011), p. 367.
15 Gencon Clause 1, lines 1-14, Clause 4, lines 32-49 and Clause 5, lines 50-88.
7Freedom of contract plays a central role and constitutes the general rule in chartering under 
English and Norwegian law.16 Nonetheless, Maritime Code Chapter 13 will be mandatorily 
applicable if conditions pursuant to Sections 252 and 253 are present. Furthermore, Chapter 
14 of the 1994 Maritime Code confirms this general rule but also contains some exceptions as 
one will see below.17
In charterparty trade, parties are professional players with equal knowledge of the particular 
trade and have a similar if not equivalent bargaining power when negotiating these contracts. 
Parties are allowed to freely agree on the terms of the contract. However, as said, Chapter 14
contains some limitations to the latter freedom, both applicable to in voyage and time char-
ters. Statutory control over contractual freedom takes the form of mandatory rules provided in 
Chapter 13 and applicable to cargo damage and delay situations in the context of charterparty 
trade and (cf. Sections 253 and 322).
As for voyage chartering, there are limitations in inter-Nordic trade as per (i) Section 322, 
second, third and fourth paragraphs; (ii) tramps bills of lading pursuant to Section 325; (iii) 
and, for cargo damage and delayed delivery pursuant to Section 347. The main implication is 
that Sections 274 to 285 and 287 to 289 will be applicable between the shipowner and the 
charterer and between the shipowner and the receiver who is not the voyage charterer or be-
tween the shipowner and a holder of a bill of lading. Section 286 applies to sub-carrier liabili-
ty. 
In time chartering, there are also some limitations pursuant to (i) Section 325 on tramps bills 
of lading; (ii) and Section 383 makes applicable Sections 274 to 285 and 287 to 289 (on cargo 
liability and limits of liability of the shipowner), between the shipowner and the charterer, 
between the shipowner and the receiver who is not the time charterer and between the shi-
powner and a bill of lading holder. Section 286 on the liability of the sub-carrier applies cor-
                                                
16 Cf. Section 322, second paragraph.
17 Sections 321 to 325; also in particular for time charters, see Sections 372 to 394.
8respondingly as well. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 383, first paragraph, second sentence,
provisions regarding domestic trade in Norway in Section 276, third paragraph, on loss due to 
nautical fault and fire and Section 280, second paragraph, on limits of liability, do not apply. 
International charterparty trade does not fall in this situation. 
1.5 Mandatory rules dogma under Norwegian law
Mandatory rules are rules that will be enforced irrespective of the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the contract. Default or supplementary rules can be modified by agreement and 
fill contractual gaps left by the parties. 
The Norwegian approach on indemnities in situations where the shipowner incurs greater 
liability for bills of lading inconsistent with the terms of the charterparty flows from various 
legal sources.18 Under English law, solutions on analogous indemnity situations have devel-
oped from a line of general common law cases and both voyage and time charter decisions.19
                                                
18 See the Norwegian Maritime Code Sections 338, third paragraph and 382, first paragraph, 
second sentence; see also The Vestkyst I case in ND 1961.325 NH and The Jobst Oldendorff
arbitration award in ND 1979.364 NV. However, there are other Norwegian cases dealing 
with indemnities in time charters but not exactly with the particular issue of mandatory rules. 
In particular, see ND 1954.445 NSC (Skogholm); ND 1957.61 NSC (Skånland); ND 
1961.127 NV (Granville) commented in Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brauta-
set, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 
2011), p. 447.
19 Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 4 Bing 66; Humphrys v Pratt (1831) 5 Bli NS 154; Betts v Gib-
bins (1834) 2 Ad & E 57; Toplis v Grane (1839) 5 Bing NC 636; Dugdale v Lovering (1875) 
10 CP 196; Milburn v. Jamaica Fruit [1900] 2 Q.B. 540; Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay
[1905] A.C.; Kruger v. Moel Tryvan [1907] A.C. 272 as per Lord Loreburn; Tillmanns v. 
Knutsford [1908] A.C. 410; The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185; The Nanfri [1979] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 201; The Vikfrost [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 560; The Garbis [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
283; The Caroline P [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 466; The C. Joyce [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 285; 
The Paros [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 269; The Nogar Marin [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 412; The Is-
land Archon [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 227; Petroleo Brasiliero S.A. (Respondent) v E.N.E. Kos 
1 Limited (Appellant) [2012]. 
9Mandatory rules contained in Chapter 13 will be applicable to contracts of carriage and also 
to charterparty trade if conditions pursuant to Sections 252 and 253 are fulfilled.20 Further-
more, liability will be imposed upon the shipowner if cargo liability elements are present pur-
suant to Sections 274, 275 and 276.21
Under Norwegian law, The Vestkyst I, a voyage charter case (“The Vestkyst I”), involved an 
indemnity claim from the shipowner that incurred greater liability for bills of lading inconsis-
tent with the charterparty terms.22 Indemnity against the charterer was based on the 1893 Ma-
ritime Code Section 95, third paragraph (current Maritime Code Section 338 that also finds its 
parallel in Section 382 on time charters), and on a broad exclusion of liability clause con-
tained in the Gencon charterparty. The Norwegian Supreme Court interpreted the exclusion of 
liability clause in a stricter manner, only considering its passive implication, and not as a 
course of action (only as a shield, not as a sword). This particular point is aligned with the 
English case The C. Joyce that will be analyzed in Chapter 2.23 Reasonable arguments could 
be raised in order to interpret an exclusion of liability clause in the opposite manner but prac-
tice shows that Gencon voyage charters these days have been amended and that an express 
                                                
20 Under Norwegian law see Act of 4 February 1938 no. 3 on the Implementation of the In-
ternational Convention on Bills of Lading of 24 August 1924. The Hague-Visby Rules or 
amended Hague Rules were introduced domestic legislation in 1973. However, these days not 
every Section in Chapter 13 of the Norwegian Maritime Code belongs to the Hague-Visby 
Rules. Chapter 13 of also adopted some rules from the 1978 United Nations Convention on 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea or Hamburg Rules. The Hamburg Rules represent a later set of 
rules on international carriage of cargo by sea and multimodal transportation. In England the 
Hague Rules were ratified in 1930. In addition, the Hague-Visby Rules became effective in 
England pursuant to the 1971 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (as per Section 1). The 1992 Car-
riage of Goods by Sea also supplements the 1971 Act and constitutes the most recent statuto-
ry regulation on bills of lading rules under English law.
21 See Chapter 13, Sections 274 to 290, on the Carrier’s Liability for Damages. 
22 ND 1961.325 NH (Vestkyst I).
23 The C. Joyce [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 285.
10
indemnity for bills of lading consequences and liabilities has been included in order to avoid 
any uncertainty.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected the argument based on Section 95, third paragraph. 
The reason was that Section 95 does not apply when increased liability in bills of lading re-
sults from the application of mandatory rules (Hague Rules as incorporated in 1938 to the 
Maritime Code). The effect was that in this particular case a contractual gap (absence of ex-
press indemnity) plus the application of mandatory rules did not admit recourse. The latter 
point constitutes a dogmatic approach that will be analyzed in depth, as one of the central 
topics of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis aims to prove that the approach of the Supreme Court in The Vestkyst 
I, on the applicability of mandatory rules constitutes a dogma. A dogma is a belief accepted 
without question.24 First, due to the absence of analysis regarding how mandatory rules inte-
ract with indemnity provisions in situations of inconsistency between bills of lading and char-
terparty terms under Norwegian law. Second, due to the scarce explanation of how freedom 
of contract plays a fundamental role as a matter of principle in these cases. Third, the Su-
preme Court did not explain what would have been the result had the shipowner incurred lia-
bility from mandatory rules under a charterparty containing an express indemnity. Cargo lia-
bility to a shipowner is most of the time imposed due to the application of mandatory rules 
that protect the cargo side and if recourse is rejected due to their operation, that would mean 
that express indemnity clauses would not be likely upheld either.
In the aftermath of The Vestkyst I case, arbitrator professor Brækhus when rendering The 
Jobst Oldendorff arbitration award undertook further analysis on the application of The Vest-
                                                
24 <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogma> Accessed 21.10.2013
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kyst I case as a matter of principle. I will refer to the relevant ideas of this arbitration as far as 
they are related to the topic of this thesis.25
Furthermore, the existence of the aforesaid dogmatic approach constitutes an open invitation 
for research, making a comparative analysis with English related doctrines on indemnity re-
courses in charter parties. Whether The Vestkyst I mandatory rules dogma is likely to be ap-
plicable these days also to equivalent indemnity situations in time charters is something that 
definitively deserves further analysis. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to provide addi-
tional elements to consider. 
This thesis aims to prove primarily that the application of The Vestkyst I doctrine to time 
charters may not be entirely suitable if we contrast it with solutions under English law. Fur-
thermore, as said, even these days, the application of The Vestkyst I doctrine to voyage char-
ters would not be appropriate either, because current Gencon voyage charter, Clause 10, con-
tains an express indemnity for bills of lading liabilities.26
The English approach to indemnity in time charters does not consider the interaction of con-
tractual terms with mandatory rules of law. Under English law it has never been a legal ques-
tion brought to courts. Had the mandatory rules dogma been tested under English law, courts 
would have had quite a few opportunities to deal with analogous dogmas, since the ratifica-
tion of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. Curiously, research for this dissertation has shown 
that it has never examined this issue in such a manner. English law distinguishes between 
express and implied indemnities, as will be explained. Also English law considers other ele-
                                                
25 See The Jobst Oldendorff arbitration award ND 1979.364 NV; see English translation in 
Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, 
Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 30.
26 Gencon 1994, Clause 10, lines 154-163, contains an express indemnity from the charterer 
to the shipowner “[…] against all consequences or liabilities that may arise from the signing 
of bills of lading as presented […]”. 
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ments, such as foreseeability and types of recoverable damages when analyzing such dis-
putes. 
This thesis aims to show that English law has similar solutions, when compared to Norwegian 
law, on whether or not to grant indemnity recourses in cases of shipowner liability for bills of 
lading containing different terms from those in charterparties. It also aims to prove that bases 
for indemnity provisions under English law somewhat differ. This will be developed in Chap-
ter 2. 
1.6 Indemnity provisions under Norwegian law
Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence, provides basis for indemnity in situations 
where the shipowner “[…] incurs liability to the holder of a bill of lading in excess of the 
liability according to the chartering agreement”27. This implied indemnity will be analyzed 
below because it is one of the central points of this dissertation. 
Norwegian law also accepts the use of standard forms that contain express indemnity clauses, 
e.g. Shelltime Clause 13, NY Produce Clause 30 (b), Baltime Clause 9. 
Maritime Code, Section 338, third paragraph, second sentence, in the case of voyage charters,
provides basis for implied indemnity in situations where the shipowner incurs greater liability 
for issuance of bills of lading containing other terms than those stated in the charterparty.28
This Section will be analyzed in this dissertation due to the role it may play in the interpreta-
tion of Section 382, second paragraph, second sentence.
                                                
27 Cf. Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence. 
28 Cf. Section 338, third paragraph. 
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Section 381, third paragraph, provides that if the shipowner “[…] incurs liability for damages 
as a result of the loading, stowing, trimming, securing, discharging or delivery of the cargo 
[…]” the charterer shall indemnify the shipowner.29 Indemnity in this case is based on the 
specific roles and allocation of costs that the parties have in the time charter. Thus, the char-
terer shall assume any liability incurred by the shipowner arising from the performance of 
these functions. Furthermore, in connection with Section 381, third paragraph, liability in-
curred by the shipowner due to stevedore liability (injuries) as per The Jobst Oldendorff arbi-
tration award, also provide basis for indemnity. This will be explained in Chapter 2. 
Finally, cases of joint and several liability of the carrier and sub-carrier, pursuant to the Mari-
time Code Section 287, third paragraph, allow recourse.30 Nonetheless, these recourse situa-
tions exceed the aim of this dissertation and will not be analyzed. 
1.7 Indemnity under the Maritime Code Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence 
As expressed above, Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence provides that “If the time 
carrier thereby incurs liability to the holder of the bill of lading in excess of the liability ac-
cording to the chartering agreement, the time charterer shall hold the time carrier harmless.”
Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence, presents a legal hypothesis under which the 
time carrier (that will generally be the shipowner) incurs liability to a holder of a bill of lad-
ing, in situations where bills of lading contain liability in excess of the liability contained in 
the time charter. Consequently, the shipowner may have a right to recourse against the char-
                                                
29 Cf. Section 381, first and third paragraph.
30 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The 
Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011), p. 359, 407.
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terer to hold him harmless.31
As for an analysis of the conditions to request recourse under Section 382, first paragraph, 
second sentence, one can say the following:
First, however implicit in the language of Section 382, this indemnity requires a cargo claim
(litigation, arbitration or settlement), where the shipowner is liable towards the cargo side.32
Second, the liability imposed to the shipowner in the cargo claim should be in excess of the 
liability terms in the time charter. The obligation of the shipowner to pay for liability to the 
cargo side will usually be imposed by application of mandatory rules (the Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules as enacted into domestic legislation). If the shipowner would 
also be held liable both under the time charter and mandatory rules, the mandatory rules 
dogma would not have the same weight; there would be no discrepancy between the charter-
party and the bills of lading. Hence, there would be a situation of coordination of liability 
terms between the charterparty and applicable mandatory rules and the hypothesis under Sec-
tion 382, first paragraph, second sentence, would not be applicable and/or indemnities subject 
to this provision would never be upheld. 
Third, if the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled, the shipowner would be allowed to
look to the charterer for indemnity under Section 382, in order to recover what he paid in the 
cargo claim. 
                                                
31 To hold harmless in English means to hold unharmed, to indemnify or to be considered not 
liable. In Norwegian the term would be comprised by the expresion “holde skadesløs” that 
means literally, to hold harmless. However, the word indemnity comes from Latin, from in-
demnus and indemnun that also comes from damnun (or damage) plus the prefix “in”, mean-
ing “no damage” or harmless. Also, the term indemnity in English is a noun that comes from 
the verb to indemnify. 
32 Cf. Sections 274 to 276 of the Maritime Code.
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1.8 Indemnity provisions under English law
In England there are no statutory bases whatsoever for the indemnity situation that concerns 
the topic for analysis of the present dissertation. However, as one will see below, English 
courts have accepted indemnities in the charterparty context on two different bases, an ex-
press term in a charterparty and implied indemnities (as terms implied in fact). 
Under English law, if the charter contains an express term for situations of inconsistencies 
between bills of lading and the charterparty, the indemnity will be construed as a contractual
term. Common charterparty forms are very relevant in this context as well. Examples of time 
charter forms widely used in the industry are Shelltime, Baltime, NY Produce, etc. As ex-
plained below, these time charter forms contain express indemnity clauses for the case of lia-
bility arising from bills of lading. Hence, one sees no reason to reproduce the express wording 
of indemnity provisions provided by these standard forms. 
In addition, in England, when there is no express term covering the situation, this is analyzed 
as an implied indemnity situation. English law solves contractual gaps as Norwegian law but 
in a different manner. Norwegian legal system uses default rules. English law implied terms, 
as per The Moorcock.33 Then, an implied indemnity is not more than an implied term of the 
contract.
In particular, under English law implied indemnities foster contractual workability, inferring
the intention of the parties based on different approaches (either, under the business efficacy
test analysis, or, under the reasonable bystander test [or a “fly on the wall”]). In particular, in 
The Moorcock, Bowen LJ said in p. 68: 
“An implied warranty, or as it is called a covenant in law, as distinguished 
                                                
33 The Moorcock [1889] 14 PD 64; Jill Poole, Contract Law, (11th edn, Oxford 2012), pp. 
213-214. 
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from an express contract or express warranty, really is in all cases founded upon the 
presumed intention of the parties, and upon reason. The implication which the law 
draws from what must obviously have been the intention of the parties, the law draws 
with the object of giving efficacy to the transaction and preventing such a failure of 
consideration as cannot have been within the contemplation of either side.”34
In conclusion, as briefly presented, Norwegian and English laws generally offer similar solu-
tions when analyzing indemnity provisions in charterparty trade. Particular answers to legal 
questions presented will be analyzed and compared in the following two Chapters.
                                                
34 The Moorcock [1889] 14 PD, p. 68.
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2 INDEMNITY IN TIME CHARTERS UNDER NORWEGIAN AND ENGLISH 
LAW 
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter aims to answer how implied indemnities have been understood, in particular, in 
time charters, pursuant to Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence of the Norwegian
Maritime Code and under English law. References to Section 338 will be made when appro-
priate. Consequently, I have divided this part into two: Norwegian Maritime Codes, con-
trasted with their preparatory works and case law, on the one hand, and English law, on the 
other. Additionally, the wording in Sections 95 and 141 of the 1893 Code, and 338 and 382 of 
the 1994 Code, possess a declaratory nature. That is, these rules apply only if the parties have 
not agreed expressly anything to the contrary or have kept silence in the contract. 
English law on the topic is based on a line of common law and maritime decisions that have 
developed solutions on indemnities in time and voyage charters context.
2.2 Norwegian Maritime Codes
In order to answer mainly how above-mentioned indemnities have been understood in time 
charters in Norway, one has to start with two pieces of maritime legislation, the 1893 and 
1994 Maritime Codes plus preparatory works. Nonetheless, the 1994 Code repealed the 1893 
Code and this dissertation will focus on the current Code in force.35
                                                
35 Section 511 of the 1994 Maritime Code. 
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Reference to the 1936 preparatory works has been done due to the inclusion of time charters 
provisions, for the first time, within the 1893 Code.
In Norway, preparatory works are of great interest and their examination assist judges, practi-
tioners and scholars when interpreting statutory provisions. Norwegian scholars expressed in 
this regard that “[…] the legislative history may demonstrate that a particular rule or term is 
to be understood in a certain way […]”36
The 1893 Code and its legislative history maintain its importance today because in the 1994 
Maritime Code the number of provisions on time charters in Chapter 14, was increased, nev-
ertheless had only a “[…] few substantive changes in existing rules […]”37 Some of these 
changes had impact on the pertinent provisions applicable to indemnities that concern this 
research and will be analyzed in the present Chapter.
Research for this dissertation has showed that the legislative records of the Maritime Law 
Committee of 1893 and 1994 Codes do refer to the problems on indemnity clauses in time 
charters. Additionally, voyage charter and time charter indemnities share a common historical 
background and references to voyage charters provisions preparatory works and case law will 
be done. 
Preparatory works of 1936 and 1993 refer to indemnity for liability incurred by the shipowner 
in cases of bills of lading containing greater liability conditions (or liability in excess) than 
the charterparty terms. In the 1936 preparatory works there is no reference to the operation of 
mandatory rules in the drafting history of Sections 95 and 141 of the 1893 Code, or how 
                                                
36 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Maw:  The 
Norwegian Perspective (2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2008), p. 29.
37 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Maw:  The 
Norwegian Perspective (2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2008), p. 417; NOU 1994: 36, p. 83. 
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mandatory rules may increase liability exposure of the shipowner in charters subject to Nor-
wegian law due to their operation.38 Preparatory works of 1993 refer to the mandatory rules
operation but as an exception, that does not grant recourse.
In addition, this thesis has disregarded from analysis preparatory works pieces: (i) the IX Re-
port of the Maritime Law Committee (“Innstilling IX fra Sjølovkomitéen”) of 21 December 
1956 because has no interest for this article;39 and, the NOU 1972: 11 (“Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger 1972: 11”) because it does not provide any substantial finding on time charter
indemnities.40
2.3 The 1893 Code and preparatory works of 1936
First, as one may notice, the 1893 Maritime Code (“Sjøfartsloven av 20 juli 1893”) originally 
did not contain any rules on time chartering (“tidsbefraktning bestemmelser”). Only after 
1938, Sections 141 to 150 on time charters were added. The most relevant provision of the 
1938 amendment to the 1893 Code is Section 141, second sentence, because it deals with the 
indemnity situation due to issuance of bills of lading inconsistent with time charter terms. 
Moreover, Section 95 of the 1893 Maritime Code is relevant for current interpretation of Sec-
tions 338 and 382 of the 1994 Code.41
                                                
38 Ot. prp. nr. 23 (1937), pp. 1-23; see Susanne Moshuus, ‘Lasteansvar I tidsbefraktningsfor-
hold’, MarIus no. 193 (1992), p. 15. 
39 Justis og politidepartementet, Innstilling IX fra Sjølovkomitéen, Utkast med motive til lov 
om endring av reglene om befordring av passasjerer og reisegods (sjøfartslovens kap. 6 (nytt) 
m.m.), Komitéen oppnevnt ved Kronprinsregentens resolusjon av 21. Desember 1956. 
40 Justis og politidepartementet, NOU 1972: 11, Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 
Godsbefordring til Sjøs, Utkast med motive til lov om endring av reglene om befordring av 
gods til sjøs (Innarbeidelse av “Haag-Visby-reglene” I sjøfartsloven kap. 5, m.m.); 
Utredninger instilling X fra Utvalget til revisjon av sjøfartslovgivningen. (Sjølovkomitéen).
41 Ot. prp. nr. 23 (1937), pp. 1-23.
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What does the 1893 Code, Section 141, second sentence provide? And, in particular, what did 
the 1936 Maritime Law Committee say about Section 141?
As for the first question, the 1893 Maritime Code, Section 141, second sentence, provides 
that
“The carrier is obliged to issue a bill of lading for the goods loaded with the 
conditions of carriage, which are customary in the particular trade. If he incurs thereby 
increased liability, the charterer shall hold him harmless (“skadesløs”).”42 [Emphasis 
added.]
Second, the preparatory works of the 1936 Maritime Legal Committee (“Innstilling fra 
Sjølovkommisjonen, Oslo 7 mai.1936”) only provide some limited explanation, on the word-
ing of Section 141, second sentence. 
In these legislative records, there is no reference whatsoever to the problem that 25 years after 
was presented in The Vestkyst I case, i.e. the right of recourse of the carrier against the char-
terer considering the interaction and legal implications of mandatory rules (the Hague Rules). 
As said in Chapter 1, the indemnity claim of the shipowner in the aforesaid case was based 
both on Section 95 and an exclusion of liability clause contained in a Gencon voyage charter.
However, these clauses have been understood as clauses providing a right to exclude liability 
but not to look for indemnity, i.e. serving a purpose only as a shield but not as a sword. As for 
Section 95, the Supreme Court disregarded it as a basis for indemnity because the shipowner 
liability in the cargo claim was a consequence of the operation of mandatory rules and not to 
greater liability in bills of lading. This thesis will elaborate further on this point.
                                                
42 The original text of Section 141 of the 1893 Maritime Code in Norwegian reads as follows: 
“Bortfrakteren er pliktig til å utstede konnossement for innlastet gods med de vilkår for 
befordringen som er sedvanlige i den pågjeldende fart. Pådrar han sig derved øket ansvar, 
skal befrakteren holde ham skadesløs.”
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When the 1936 Maritime Law Committee elaborated on Section 141, second sentence made 
express reference to Section 95 of the 1893 Code. The Reports Committee read as follows: 
“As the time charterer often sub-lets [sub-charters out] the ship or assumes re-
sponsibilities as carrier of general cargo, it is important for him to request that the car-
rier must issue a bill of lading with the conditions of carriage which are customary in 
the particular trade. This is accounted for in the draft bill. § 141, which, however, 
gives the carrier the right of recourse against the time charterer, if he incurs stricter 
liability in the bill of lading due to conditions different than he would have by the time 
charter, cf. on voyage charters § 95, third paragraph. See also the Dutch Law § 518 d 
and Carver sect. 161b [...]”43 [Emphasis added]
One may wonder whether reference to “cf. on voyage charters Section 95, third paragraph
and to Carver, means that indemnity in Section 141 should be construed by analogy.44 A to-
tally separate point is the question of mandatory rules that was not expressly addressed by the 
Committee as one may notice. 
                                                
43 The original text in Norwegian of the “Motiver til utkast til lov om forandringer I 
sjøfartsloven in Innstilling fra Sjølovkommisjonen, Oslo 7 mai.1936, femte kapitel”, p. 68, 
reads as follows: “Da tidsbefrakteren ofte frembortfrakter skibet eller overtar 
stykkgodsbefordring, er det av betydning for ham å kunne kreve at bortfrakteren skal 
utferdige konnossementer med de vilkår for befordringen som er sedvanlige i den 
pågjeldende fart. Hertil er der tatt hensyn i utk. § 141, som imidlertid gir bortfrakteren rett til 
regress overfor tidsbefrakteren, såfremt han ved konnossement pådrar sig et strengere ansvar 
enn han vilde ha efter tidscertepartiet; jfr. om reisebefraktning § 95, 3dje ledd. Se også den 
hollandske lov § 518 d og Carver sect. 161b. Efter omstendighetene vil innskrenkninger i 
regressretten kunne følge av avtalen; jfr. § 71. Se også bemerkningene til utk. II § 5. Det er 
unødvendig å si i loven at tidbefrakteren ikke kan forlange konnossement som med hensyn til 
datering, beskrivelse av godset eller i andre henseende strider mot det virkelige forhold.”
44 Carver, Carriage by Sea (12th edn Stevens & Sons 1971) at p. 374, refers to the implied 
indemnity by the charterer “[…] which impose on the shipowner a greater obligation by their 
conditions than that imposed by the charterparty […]”. He also refers to Krugel v. Moel Try-
van Ship Co. and Elder, Dempster v. Dunn.
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For the 1936 Committee these two recourse situations (in Sections 95 and 141) are based on a 
common problem that may affect shipowners both under voyage and time charters, i.e. great-
er liability for issuance of bills of ladings containing greater liability terms than the charter-
parties.
Nonetheless, what is the actual meaning of the expression “increased liability” in Section 
141? Surprisingly, the Maritime Law Committee did not answer. The Committee only made a 
reference to the expression “stricter liability” (or “strengere ansvar” in Norwegian). Thus, that 
would be the content of the expression “increased liability” in Section 141. But if one goes 
deeper into the implications, “increased” and “stricter” do not necessarily match.
What is the problem with these two expressions?
First, the expression “increased liability” in Section 141 would imply bills of lading with 
terms exposing the carrier to enlarged, expanded or greater liability. 
Second, the wording in the 1936 Reports “stricter liability” would mean harsher, closer, nar-
rower liability in bills of lading terms compared to the terms of the time charterparty. 
A simple exercise of logic shows that stricter/narrower/closer does not mean in-
creased/enlarged/expanded.
Therefore, as one may see, from the analysis above, there is some ambiguity that may trigger
some sort of conceptual resistance between both expressions.
Another issue is to answer the question whether the expression “increased liability” in Section 
141 regarding bills of lading also comprehends “mandatory rules”.
If yes, as is usual, bills of lading terms would be more likely to be interpreted in order to ex-
pose the shipowner to increased cargo liability. Therefore, this inconsistency between the 
charter and bills of lading would entitle the shipowner to look for indemnity. But if the own-
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er’s indemnity recourse against the charterer is denied due to the operation of mandatory 
rules, then the charterer would be released from liability that perhaps should fall on his side
due to the particular role he plays in the time charter or in accordance with the express 
agreement of the parties. Then the risk allocation system that a time charter may contain
would be shifted from one side to the other. On the other hand, if the expression does not in-
clude mandatory rules that permeate to the charter, the shipowner notwithstanding being lia-
ble towards holders of bills of lading may look to the charterer for indemnity. Thus, the prob-
lem is to leave mandatory rules operational in one level, that is the cargo claim and not to 
permeate it to the time charter level.
Furthermore, the 1936 preparatory works on Section 141, second sentence, made no express
reference to the distinction between express or implied indemnities that is developed by Eng-
lish law. Implied indemnities in English law are based on the observance of charterer’s orders 
(employing the vessel) that cause a loss to the shipowner, however, in absence of express 
terms. As referred above, express indemnities are those indemnity provisions explicitly
agreed by the parties, e.g. Shelltime, Clause 13.  
2.4 The 1994 Maritime Code and preparatory works of 1993
Norwegian Maritime Code, Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence provides that 
“If the time carrier thereby incurs liability to the holder of the bill of lading in 
excess of the liability according to the chartering agreement, the time charterer shall 
hold the time carrier harmless.” [Emphasis added]
As for the wording in Section 382, one would have expected a better formulation on this type 
of indemnities, due to existing developments on the matter at the time it was drafted.45 How-
ever, one must concede that some linguistic changes were made to this provision. 
                                                
45 Cf. Ot. prp. nr. 55 om lov om sjøfarten (sjøloven), pp. 57 and 62.
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The new mandatory rules exception to Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence, was 
formulated in the 1993 preparatory works.46 For the particular analysis of indemnity under 
Section 382, please refer to previous part 1.7 in this dissertation. 
In addition, preparatory works on Section 329 on voyage charter indemnities, in its third pa-
ragraph, (current Section 338, third paragraph) referred to former Section 95 of the 1893 
Code. The 1993 Committee expressed its view, as follows:
“The third paragraph [of draft Section 329, currently Section 338] is consistent 
with the Maritime Code § 95, fourth paragraph. The provision gives the carrier re-
course against the charterer if the bill of lading is issued with different conditions than 
the charter agreement and the carrier for that reason incurs a larger liability than it has 
pursuant to the chartering agreement. It is, however, only increased liability arising 
from the terms of the bill of lading that provides recourse. Increased liability resulting 
from mandatory rules does not provide recourse. This is consistent with current law, 
see the Supreme Court judgment in The Vestkyst I case, which is found in the ND 
1961 page 325, and the arbitral award of Jobst Oldendorff case, which is reproduced 
in ND 1979 page 364.”47 [Emphasis added]
                                                
46 See NOU 1993: 36, Godsbefordring til sjøs Utredning XV fra utvalget til revisjon av 
sjøfartslovivningen (Sjølovkomiteen), Avgitt til Justis – og politidepartamentet, november 
1993, pp. 68 and 88. 
47 The original text in Norwegian reads as follows: “Tredje ledd er i samsvar med sjøloven § 
95, fjerde ledd. Bestemmelsen gir bortfrakteren regress mot befrakteren dersom det utstedes 
konnossement med andre vilkår enn i befraktningsavtalen og bortfrakteren av den grunn 
påføres større ansvar enn denne har etter befraktningsavtalen. Det er imidlertid bare økt 
ansvar som følge av vilkårene i konnossement som gir regress. Økt ansvar som følge av 
tvingende regler gir ikke regressen. Dette er i samsvar med gjeldende rett, jf Høyesteretts 
dom i Vestkyst I saken, som er gjengitt i Nordiske Domme i Sjøfartsanliggender 1961 siden 
325, og voldgiftsdommen i Jobst Oldendorff saken, som er gjengitt i Nordiske Domme i 
Sjøfartsanliggender 1979 s. 364.”
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Furthermore, as for the 1993 preparatory works on Section 373 (current Section 382), reports
have not added anything new to the issue on indemnity recourse due to issuance of bills of 
lading with “liability in excess”. However, the Committee referred to Section 141 and per-
haps “stepped” on the same stone (cf. reference to discussion above). Then, one may repro-
duce again the same observations made when analyzing Section 141 and the 1936 preparatory 
works. Thus, one sees no need to repeat extensively this part of the preparatory works.48
Professor Solvang expressing his view on this particular issue, said “[…] indemnity under 
Section 382 is [also] restricted to increased liability imposed by the terms of the bills of lad-
ing, not by mandatory liability rules (e.g. Hague-Visby as enacted by national legislation). 
Moreover, Section 382 corresponds to Section 338 third paragraph regarding voyage charter-
ing.”49 His idea refers to the express wording for indemnity under Section 382 (cf. 338) and 
to the lack of reference to the aforesaid exception based on mandatory rules.
Additionally, the 1993 Committee when elaborating on Section 373 did not consider the 
“function” of the parties to time charters and the wide range of indemnity claims that may 
differ from those under a voyage charter, e.g. issuance of bills of lading, which is a function 
executed solely in the interest of the charterer. The Committee could have done so by simply
referring to the discussion on Section 372 in NOU 1993: 36.50 The express wording in Sec-
                                                
48 NOU 1993: 36, p. 88, in Norwegian reads as follows: “Første ledd tilvarer sjøloven § 
141…I slike tilfelle kan tidsbefrakter kreve at det utstedes konnossementer som kan meføre et 
strengere ansvar for bortfrakteren som transportør enn ansvar som han har I 
certepartiforholddet. Tidsbortfrakter må således ta risikoen for at tidsbefrakter klarer å 
oppfylle regressansvaret. Bestemmelsen er I overensstemmelse med certepatitpraksis.” [Em-
phasis added]. It is important to say again that the preparatory works in this regard do not 
deny the possibility of expressly agreeing an indemnity for stricter liability terms in the bills 
of lading, e.g. Shelltime, Clause 13. 
49 See footnote nr. 19 in Trond Solvang, ‘The English doctrine of indemnity for compliance 
with time charterers’ orders – does it exists under Norwegian law?’ MarIus nr. 419 (2012), p. 
20.
50 NOU 1993: 36 at p. 88, on Section 372 (current 381) in Norwegian reads as follows: 
“Utgangspunktet er at dersom ansvaret er oppstått under utførelse av en av de funksjoner 
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tion 381, first paragraph states that the “[…] charterer shall provide and pay for the reception, 
loading, stowing, trimming, securing, discharging and delivery of the cargo […]” and Section 
381, third paragraph, states a basis for indemnity for consequences arising from those specific 
functions, imposing liability upon the shipowner. Why bills of lading would be then excluded 
from the same solution if they were issued performing a function in the interest of the char-
terer? Perhaps the charterer should finally provide for liabilities arising as a consequence of 
the issuance of bills of lading.51
In other words, one may wonder if the above-mentioned interest of the charterer when issuing 
bills of lading in accordance with Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence, may be ana-
lyzed similarly to the functions and indemnity under Section 381. 
Likewise, the 1993 Committee when analyzing current Section 382 did not explain clearly the 
implications of the applicability of mandatory rules to time charter indemnities. However, the 
Committee was strongly influenced by The Vestkyst I decision. That justifies the Committee’s
interpretation offered for the case of applicability of mandatory rules in connection with Sec-
tion 338, thus, refusing grounds for indemnity in case of discrepancy in bills of lading result-
ing from the application of mandatory rules.
As referred to in Chapter 1, Section 322, third paragraph refers to the specific rule contained 
in Section 338, on the issuance of bills of lading with inconsistent terms. Generally, Section 
322 makes Chapter 13 applicable to a number of chartering situations, e.g. domestic Norwe-
                                                                                                                                                       
tidsbefrakter har, vil ansvaret hvile på ham […]” In English means “The principle is that if 
the liability has arisen during the execution of one of the functions the time charterer has, the 
responsibility will rest on him.”; on the functional argument in time charters see NOU 1993: 
36, pp. 87-88; Susanne Moshuus, ‘Lasteansvar I tidsbefraktningsforhold’, MarIus no. 193 
(1992), p. 23. References are made to Section 139, first paragraph (current Section 381). 
51 Cf. Section 382 and Section 381, first paragraph, first sentence, on loading and discharging, 
reads as follows: “The time charterer shall provide and pay for the reception, loading, stow-
ing, trimming securing, discharging and delivery of the cargo.”
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gian chartering, inter-Nordic chartering and chartering between Norway and the situations 
covered by numbers 1 to 5, in Section 252. Notwithstanding, again, Section 322, third para-
graph, solely applies between the carrier, as defined in Section 251, and the holder of a bill of 
lading (Cf. Section 325). Strangely, Section 322 does not provide that is applicable to the 
situation covered by Section 382, first paragraph, second sentence. 
Finally, the Committee did not refer to indemnity cases based on contracts containing express
indemnity, such as Shelltime Clause 13, or even to voyage charters containing such indemni-
ties, and their conceivable interaction with mandatory rules under Chapter 13. 
2.5 Norwegian case law
What does Norwegian case law add in this regard? This thesis will elaborate on two Norwe-
gian cases: The Vestkyst I case and The Jobst Oldendorff arbitration award. 
First, The Vestkyst I, however, a decision on a Gencon voyage charter, reveals the analysis of 
the Norwegian Supreme Court that decided, on the right of indemnity of the shipowner
against the charterer due to liability imposed upon the first. The cargo receiver that was not 
the charterer and based on mandatory rules requested liability in the cargo claim.52
In this case, the shipowner of the vessel Vestkyst I was required to pay compensation for
shortage in a cargo of aluminum bars. Consequently, the shipowner looked for indemnity 
                                                
52 Gencon voyage charter forms in the 1960s, and in particular in this case, did not contain 
any express indemnity clause in case the carrier signed inconsistent bills of lading. The Court 
found that this charter, from 1915, however revised after the adoption of the Hague Rules did 
not contain an express indemnity. This form only provided the voyage carrier with an exclu-
sion of liability clause, see Clauses 2 and 9. Exclusions clauses are generally strictly con-
strued. The Norwegian Supreme decision is aligned with the English decision Ben Line Ship-
ping Co. (Pt.) Ltd. of Singapore v. An Bord Bainne of Dublin (The C. Joyce), Com. Ct. (Bing-
ham J.) - 4 March 1986.
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against the charterer, in accordance with Clause 2 of the charterparty. Mosjøen Aluminium, 
also the shipper, sold the consignment CIF to English purchasers and chartered the vessel, 
The Vestkyst I, on a Gencon voyage charter form to carriage the cargo. Due to shortage the 
shipowner was required to pay compensation to the cargo receiver, protected by the Hague 
Rules regime, as enacted into domestic legislation. The Supreme Court expressed that the 
only legal question in this case was to determine whether the owner was entitled to claim in-
demnity against the charterer for the compensation paid by the owner to the cargo receiver. 
The legal basis of the shipowner’s claim was comprised by the wording of Clauses 2 and 9 of 
the Gencon voyage charter and Section 95 of the 1893 Norwegian Maritime Code. Charterer 
claimed that there was no sufficient basis for indemnity in the particular case and succeeded. 
The decision of the Supreme Court decision was based on the following points: 
First, for the Court, Clause 2 of the charter, “[…] extensively limits the liability of the shi-
powner for loss of or damage to […]”53 cargo, but does not contain any special reference to 
an indemnity against the charterer when a third party requires compensation from the owner 
in case of shortage or damage of the type the owner has excepted liability in the charter. Thus, 
under Norwegian law, exclusion of liability clauses must supplemented by an express indem-
nity, as its contractual counter-balance. 
Second, the Court also found that 
“The limitation of liability provision in Clause 2 is quite extensive and results 
in a severe limitation of liability which the owner would otherwise have pursuant to 
the Hague Rules and the provisions of the NMC. It is natural to interpret such a limita-
tion of liability strictly, and not interpret into its passive exemption from liability a 
                                                
53 See ND 1961. 325 NH (Vestkyst I); for a translated version to English of this decision of 
the Norwegian Supreme Court, please see Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), 
Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 14.
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positive right of indemnity, in the absence of definite support for this in its word-
ing.”54
Third, the Court established that Clause 9 of the charter, together with Clause 2, does not pro-
vide any contractual basis to the owner to claim indemnity against the charterer “[…] in the 
event a bill of lading is issued which has the effect of increasing the liability of the owner 
compared to that set out in the limitation liability provisions contained in the charterparty.”55
The Court also found, based on a book from Jantzen, that this could be easily altered by ex-
press agreement of the parties in the charter.56
Fourth, the Court also expressed that
“Further authority for the view that are grounds for a claim may be found in 
the fact that, pursuant to Clause 9 of the charterparty and § 95 of the NMC, the ship’s 
master is obliged to issue a bill of lading. The charterer has the option to transfer his 
obligation to third parties and thereby impose on the shipowner liability under the bill 
of lading pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the Act on Bills of Lading, thereby 
increasing the shipowners liability far in excess of the liability it has pursuant to the 
provisions of the charterparty.”57
                                                
54 See Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for 
Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 15.
55 The Court’s reference to Johs Jantzen, Godsbefordring til sjøs: befraktning (2nd edn Fabri-
tius 1952); see Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk In-
stitutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 16.
56 See Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for 
Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 15.
57 See Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for 
Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 15.
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Fifth, the Court said that it has not been proved that “[…] it is the practice in this country 
[Norway] or any other to construe the Gencon charterparty to the effect that it provides the 
owner with a right of indemnity against the charterer in cases such as the present case, despite 
the fact that such instances must arise regularly.” This particular point finds its parallel case 
in the English decision The C. Joyce (analyzed below).
From the above, it seems that the only clear explanation, that has to be tested, to prevent the 
applicability of the mandatory rules dogma, in order to protect shipowner’s rights to indemni-
ty under Norwegian law, is an express indemnity clause together with an exclusion of liability
clause, or at least this is what the Supreme Court seems to suggest in The Vestkyst I by pa-
raphrasing Jantzen. Professor Solvang seems to have taken a similar but not equal approach in 
the context of voyage charters.58
As said, in the aftermath of The Vestkyst I, further analysis came first from arbitrator Brækhus 
when rendering the award on The Jobst Oldendorff arbitration.59
What did the The Jobst Oldendorff say on the matter? This arbitration award is a time charter 
indemnity arbitration based on NY Produce form and is relevant because as a matter of prin-
                                                
58 See Trond Solvang, ‘Bills of lading issued under voyage charterparties: review of legal 
position under English and Scandinavian law – practical advice on how to secure shipowners’ 
right of indemnity from charterers for liabilities incurred under bills of lading’ in Nordisk  
Medlemsbladet (2003), pp. 5960-5967.
59 See ND 1979.364 NV (The Jobst Oldebdorff); see the English translation in Maritime Law 
Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 
2001, p. 33, that reads “[...] the fact that the liability which gave rise to the right of indemnity 
in The Vestkyst I case was a Hague Rule liability, clearly shows that an indemnity claim 
against the shipper was refused. This aspect of the matter was not included in the pleadings 
before the Norwegian Supreme Court, but problems would no doubt have arisen if the right of 
indemnity had been admitted; indemnity in this situation would have meant that a liability 
which, according to the mandatory provisions of the Hague Rules, is to be borne by the shi-
powner, would have been passed onto the cargo-owner, contrary to the compromise of inter-
ests provided for by the Hague Rules.” 
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ciple, picked-up some of the points left unexplained by The Vestkyst I case in the 1960s.60
Nonetheless, the arbitration did not solve a situation of shortage or damage. It dealt with an 
indemnity claim due to injuries suffered by a longshoreman. Also, the case that triggered the 
indemnity, was decided in first instance in the US, in accordance with special applicable 
mandatory rules on stevedore liability but not under the American Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act.61
As said, this arbitration involved an indemnity claim by the shipowner of the M/V Jobst Ol-
dendorff against the charterer, on the other, based on NY Produce, due to compensation paid 
to a stevedore that suffered injuries while unloading the vessel in Stapleton, USA. The Amer-
ican court obliged the shipowner to pay compensation to the injured longshoreman. 
Considering the factual scenario, the arbitration elaborated on various legal questions, i.e. (A) 
Are there grounds for a claim for indemnity? (B) Should a right of indemnity be denied in any 
event due to the fact that negligence is proven on the part of the ship’s hands? (C) Interests 
and costs. For the aim of this article only points (A) and (B) and are relevant. 
As for point (A), arbitrator Brækhus presents different situations, which are considered in-
demnity situations under general contract law, but not necessarily applicable to indemnity 
recourse in chartering due to issuance of inconsistent bills of lading: (1) joint and several lia-
bility; (2) the negotiorum gestio situation where a contracting party has “[…] incurred ex-
penses or has been held liable to a third party in some respect which, in terms of the contract, 
it is the responsibility of the other contracting party to arrange and pay for”62; (3) “The situa-
                                                
60 Jens Vogth-Erikse, ‘Regress I certepartiforhold’, MarIus no. 53 (1980), p. 20-21.
61 Falkanger, Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The 
Norwegian Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011), p. 414.
62 ND 1979.364 NA (The Jobst Oldendorff); see ND 1979.364 NV (Jobst Oldebdorff); see the 
English translation in Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nor-
disk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 31.
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tion where a contracting party assumes liability towards a third party for performance for 
which it is responsible pursuant to the contract but where […] the parties […] agreed […] to 
exclude that party’s liability […]”63 As said, perhaps professor Brækhus’ view of indemnity 
situations in Norwegian private law is quite broad for indemnity in charter trade.  
From the arbitration award, it is particularly interesting point (A) (3) above because professor 
Brækhus develops the implications of The Vestkyst I case in the charter context as follows:
“The precedents applicable to the category of indemnity claims described in 
point 3 are not relevant to this case; in reality the situation in this cases is quite differ-
ent from the other cases. Of particular interest […] is the fact that it relates to an inter-
pretation of a specific, and very extensive, limitation of liability clause in voyage char-
terparty, where the mandatory provisions of the Hague Rules applied, so that definite 
conclusions that cannot be drawn from this judgment in respect of rights of indemnity 
in charterparty cases. The Vestkyst I case was a dispute between a shipowner and a 
voyage charterer, who was also the shipper, i.e. a case between a shipowner interests 
and cargo interests.”64 [Emphasis added]
From the excerpt above one may wonder if mandatory rules aim to protect charterers with 
overlapping roles (e.g. as the shipper but not as the receiver). In accordance with Section 251 
of the Maritime Code, the shipper is “[…] the person who delivers the goods for carriage”.65
In addition, pursuant to Section 294, first paragraph, the shipper is entitled to request bills of 
lading and thus may be protected by mandatory rules, unless he transfers the bills of lading
                                                
63 ND 1979.364 NA (The Jobst Oldendorff); see ND 1979.364 NV (Jobst Oldebdorff); see the 
English translation in Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nor-
disk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 33
64 ND 1979.364 NA (The Jobst Oldendorff); see ND 1979.364 NV (Jobst Oldebdorff); see the 
English translation in Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nor-
disk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 33
65 Cf. Section 321 of the Maritime Code. 
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and conditions for mandatory rules protection do not seem to be present any longer. In a CIF 
sale, for example, also as in The Vestkyst I case, i.e. a contract that requires the seller to ar-
range the cargo transportation, the charterer was the seller and the shipper, but he transferred 
the bills of lading to an English buyer. In general, the buyer may be a consignee, endorsee or 
receiver that will not need to be the charterer, when he has transferred the bills of lading.66 In 
The Vestkyst I the charterer was the shipper but not the receiver, therefore, conditions for pro-
tection from mandatory rules were not present any longer at the moment the charterer trans-
ferred the bills of lading. Had the charterer been the shipper and the receiver at the same time,
protection by mandatory rules would have justified the rejection of the indemnity claim.
However, one should agree with The Jobst Oldendorff in the sense that the decision The Vest-
kyst I is difficult to be conceived as a general solution applicable to time charters as well.
The arbitrator excellently expressed that in The Vestkyst I case 
“[…] the fact that the liability which gave rise to the right of indemnity […]
was a Hague Rule liability, clearly shows that an indemnity claim against the shipper 
was refused. This aspect of the matter was not included in the pleadings before the 
Norwegian Supreme Court, but problems would no doubt have arisen if the right of 
indemnity had been admitted; indemnity in this situation would have meant that a lia-
bility which, according to mandatory provisions of the Hague Rules, is to be borne by 
the shipowner, would have been passed onto the cargo-owner, contrary to the com-
promise of interests provided for by the Hague Rules.”67
One may reasonably wonder if the issue presented by professor Brækhus paraphrasing the 
Norwegian Supreme Court case should be analyzed in a different manner. For example, con-
                                                
66 Thor, Hans-Jacob Bull & Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian 
Perspective (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011), p. 259.
67 ND 1979.364 NA (The Jobst Oldendorff); see the English translation in Maritime Law 
Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 
2001, p. 33.
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sidering that an indemnity against a charterer, who is also the shipper, should not be refused 
because the contract expressly provides that, making the Hague-Visby liability to be finally
borne by the charterer. This is not illogical or outrageous. This solution at least should be 
theoretically allowed under the principle of contractual freedom. Furthermore, it has not ex-
pressly been forbidden by the 1994 Code or its preparatory works.
As for point (B), on the degree of negligence, the jury’s decision or any other relevant ele-
ment considered in this regard under American law had no impact under Norwegian law. The 
arbitrator said that the “fact that the vessel was held liable to the injured port worker must be 
regarded as the effect of the “[…] particular liability risk associated with discharging in 
American ports […]” In the private contractual relationship between the vessel, the shipowner 
and the time charterer, this risk is for the latter.”68 The aforementioned quotation is the core 
of the functionality argument under Norwegian law and could be applied to a myriad of in-
demnity situations in time charters.
In conclusion, after an evaluation of legal provisions, preparatory works, case law and doc-
trine, one is left in a hesitant position as to the general application of the mandatory rules 
dogma. The mandatory rules dogma may be like a complex legal artifact, but likely to be ap-
plicable to time charters. Hence, this doctrine of “increased liability resulting from mandatory 
rules does not provide recourse” has to be compared with other experiences from Hague or 
Hague-Visby Rules States. Next Part 2.6 deals with the English approach on indemnities. 
2.6 The English approach
What does the English approach involve?
                                                
68 See ND 1979.364 NV (The Jobst Oldebdorff); see the English translation in Maritime Law 
Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 
2001, p. 35.
35
English law in the chartering context from a formal point of view classifies indemnities as 
express or implied. Voyage charters decisions also apply as a matter of principle to time char-
ter cases. Furthermore, from a substantive point of view, English law distinguishes between 
the following situations: (i) indemnity situations where bills of lading expose the owner to 
liability different to the charter terms; (ii) indemnity against consequences of delivering cargo 
without producing bills of lading; (iii) port risks; (iv) cargo risks; and, (v) navigation risks.69
As said above, this dissertation focuses on implied indemnities and on point (i) but cross-
references to (ii) will be done to illustrate a legal point below. 
As referred, English law recognizes a far-reaching right of indemnity in time charters. This 
approach provides, “[…] loss or liabilities incurred in complying with the charterer’s orders 
originates from two distinct sources. One source is the contractual terms […] however, the 
owner’s right to an indemnity was sufficiently identified with the relationship of owner that it 
applied in the absence of such a term.”70
Scrutton (1886) included a reference to an express indemnity in a time charterparty, that reads 
as follows: 
“[…] that the captain (although appointed by the owners) shall be under the 
orders and direction of the charterers as regards employment, agency, or other ar-
rangements; and the charterers hereby agree to indemnify the owners from the conse-
quences or liabilities that may arise from the captain signing bills of lading, or in oth-
erwise complying with the same.”71 [Emphasis added]
                                                
69 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008), p. 93.
70 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008), p. 93. 
71 Scrutton, (cited Foxton D., 2008, p. 93), Charterparties and Bills of Lading (Sweett & 
Maxwell 1886), p. 247.
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The extract refers generally to consequences or liability that may arise from the captain sign-
ing bills of lading. The term consequences may entail costs, penalties and liability means re-
sponsibility, i.e. for cargo damage, shortage or other bills of lading irregularities. One may 
see that there is no reference to a sort of “increased liability”, “liability in excess” or “stricter 
liability” as under Norwegian law. 
Express indemnities are also present in modern forms of time charters. For example, NY Pro-
duce 1993 form Clause 30 (b) provides “All bills of lading or waybills shall be without preju-
dice to this Charterparty and the Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all conse-
quences or liabilities which may arise from inconsistency between this Charterparty and any 
bills of lading o waybills signed by the Charterers or by the master at their request”.72 [Em-
phasis added] 
The expression “inconsistency” in NYPE Clause 30 (b) is sufficiently wide because it may 
cover situations in which the owner’s liability may be also subject to mandatory rules that 
may have an impact on shipowner’s general need of coordination of liability terms in charters 
and bills of lading. 
As for implied indemnities, it has been said that these are firstly based “[…] on a line of 
common law cases arising outside the shipping context in which a promise to indemnify 
would be implied in certain circumstances when one party acted on the directions or express 
instructions of another”.73 One should also bear in mind what has been stated on The Moor-
cock above (as per Bowen LJ).
                                                
72 See NYPE 1993, Clause 30 (b), lines 311-314.
73 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008), p. 94; see (cited in Foxton D., 2008, p. 94) Adamson v 
Jarvis (1827) 4 Bing 66; Humphrys v Pratt (1831) 5 Bli NS 154; Betts v Gibbins (1834) 2 Ad 
& E 57; Toplis v Grane (1839) 5 Bing NC 636.
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The implied indemnity doctrine has been well explained in 1875 in Dugdale v Lovering. The 
facts are as follows: the plaintiff suffered losses due delivery certain trucks (those were the 
defendant’s instructions), which were in his possession. Delivery took part based on defen-
dant’s instructions. Then the actual owner of the trucks, i.e. K.P. Colliery, sued the plaintiff 
for damages. Thus, the plaintiff looked at the defendant claiming an indemnity, which was 
not expressly recorded in an agreement. The case was for the plaintiffs.74
A first attempt to bring into line owner’s indemnity claims in the maritime context following
Dugdale v Lovering was the decision on a voyage charter indemnity, in Moel Tryvan Ship Co 
v Kruger & Co, where bills of lading issued by the charterer exposed the owner to greater 
liability than the liability terms in the voyage charter.75 In particular, the charterparty re-
quested “[…] the owner to sing bills of lading without prejudice of the charterparty”76 [Em-
phasis added]. One may argue that to sign bills of lading “without prejudice to the charterpar-
ty” is a rather general obligation, but from a foreseeability perspective, bills of lading may be 
presented either containing more or less stringent terms than the charter. Thus, if discrepancy 
arises imposing major liability upon the charter, an indemnity will find its reason. Foxton 
made a general comment on this case and other early cases in which chartering indemnities 
were viewed as a legal figure between breach of contract, indemnity or both.77 Consequently, 
we can say that English courts were not crystal clear in distinguishing whether indemnity 
                                                
74 Dugdale v Lovering (1875) 10 CP 196 (cited in Foxton D., 2008, p. 94). The relevant part 
of this decision reads as follows: “We think this evidence brings the case before us within the 
principle laid down in Betts v Gibbins (1834) 2 Ad & E 57, that when an act has been done 
by the plaintiff under the express directions of the defendant which occasions an injury to the 
rights of third persons, yes if such an act is not apparently illegal in itself, but is done honest-
ly and bona fide in compliance with the defendant’s directions, he shall be bound to indemni-
fy the plaintiff against the consequences thereof.” [Emphasis added]. 
75 [1906] 2 KB 792 (in Foxton D., 2008, p. 94, footnote 5). 
76 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008) p. 94; [1907] AC 272.
77 Elder Dempster & C v C G Dunn & Co (1909) 15 Com Cas 49.
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claims or breach of contract claims presented any substantial differences in their analysis. 78
One may also distinguish between remedy for breach and indemnity; at least theoretically 
speaking, this is relevant for causation and foreseeability (remoteness) purposes. 
An indemnity is an obligation to “[…] hold the shipowner harmless against particular losses 
or liabilities caused by the compliance with the charterer’s orders.”79 Therefore, “the cause of 
action accrues […]”80 when the liability for the indemnity has been established, and not from 
the date of the charterer’s order.81
Recovery of damages due to breach of contract is available as a right for the non-breaching 
party “[…] to be put into the position it would have been had the contract been performed as 
agreed” 82 (restitutio) and damages “[…] are to be assessed at the time the breach (or when 
the loss is suffered), which usually occurs at the time when the performance became due.”83
                                                
78 Trond Solvang, ‘Bills of lading issued under voyage charterparties: review of legal position 
under English and Scandinavian law – practical advice on how to secure shipowners’ right of 
indemnity from charterers for liabilities incurred under bills of lading’ in Nordisk Med-
lemsbladet (2003), p. 5961.
79 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008), p. 102.
80 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008), p. 102.
   
81 The Caroline P [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 466.
82 Robinson v Harman (1848) Ex 850. This case established the general rule on compensation 
in money for the loss of bargain due to breach of contract, as per Baron Parke at p. 855.
83 Jill Poole, Contract Law, (11th edn, Oxford 2012), p. 341; Milangos v George Frank Tex-
tiles Ltd [1976] AC 443. This case answered the question on which particular date a debt has 
to be paid under a foreign currency (Swiss francs). The Court decided to fix it on the date of 
conversion of the debt to the foreign currency. The general rule, the date of breach, was pre-
judicial to George Frank due to constant currency variations. 
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The general rule on causation is not to award compensation for losses, which were not caused 
by the breach of contract.84
In addition, as for the extent of damages, the doctrine of remoteness would not operate as a 
general rule in the indemnity context (as per Foxton).85 One may wonder if this was the solu-
tion followed by The Eurus in contrast with Hadley v Baxendale.86
First, in The Eurus, at the Appeals Court, it was decided that the indemnity was linked to the
breach of charter Clause 36 (that contained an obligation for the owner to make him responsi-
ble for non-compliance or delays of charterer’s orders) and if the case concerned an indemni-
ty, was particularly due to breach of contract. Thus, foreseeability test would be a necessary 
part of the assessment of indemnities as well. 
Second, in Hadley v Baxendale, the starting point of the remoteness test in a situation of 
breach of contract is to award damages (as per Alderson B) 
“[…] which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of con-
tract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising natural-
ly, […] for such breach, of contract itself, or such as may reasonably supposed to have 
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it.”
Professor Solvang has examined the above issues under Norwegian and English law, on cau-
sation and foreseeability.87
                                                
84 On causation (a question of fact) and contributory negligence and other contributory fac-
tors, see Jill Poole, Contract Law, (11th edn, Oxford 2012), p. 345.
85 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Rhidian Thomas (edit.), Legal Issues Re-
lating to time Charters (Informa 2008), p. 102.
86 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 351; Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341.
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At this stage one should continue with the main legal issue of this part of the dissertation, i.e. 
the understanding of indemnities under English law due to issuance of bills of lading contain-
ing terms exposing the owner to greater liability. 
As referred above, Dugdale v Lovering also seems to have been accepted and reaffirmed in 
the maritime law context in Strathlorne Steamship Co v Andrew Wier & Co. In this case the
representatives of the charterer ordered the master to discharge shipment “[…] without pro-
duction […]” of the necessary bills of lading. Then the cargo side successfully obtained his 
claim towards the owner. Consequently, the owner looked for indemnity based both on “[…] 
common law and the express terms […]” of the time charter. The arbitration, in the first in-
stance decided to grant the indemnity on the two bases and the Appeals Court confirmed the 
latter.88
Another remarkable case as referred above is The C. Joyce, however another Gencon voyage 
charter dispute and it finds its parallel in the Norwegian case The Vestkyst I. 
The legal question in The C. Joyce was to determine whether or not there was an implied in-
demnity in a particular exclusion of liability clause (as in The Vestkyst I). Particular solutions 
under English and Norwegian law surprisingly coincide but the indemnity in The C. Joyce
was refused based on a rather different rationale, i.e. foreseeability. Furthermore, the English 
court did not consider the application of mandatory legislation as such in its decision.89
                                                                                                                                                       
87 Trond Solvang,‘The English doctrine of indemnity for compliance with time charterers’ 
orders – does it exist under Norwegian law?’ MarIus n. 419 (2012).
88 [1934] 49 Lloyd’s L Rep 306, p. 311 (in Foxton D., 2008, p. 95); [1934] 50 Lloyd’s L Rep 
185. 
89 The C. Joyce [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 285; for the discussion on The Vestkyst I please refer to 
the relevant paragraphs above.
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As for the facts, The C. Joyce involved an amended Gencon voyage charter form that con-
tained an extensive exclusion in Clause 2, in benefit of the owner, and a rider clause in favor 
of the charterer. The purpose of the rider clause was to regulate the charterer’s right to present 
bills of lading issued under the charter including a Clause Paramount (thus incorporating the 
Hague Rules).90 Consequently, the owner was exposed to the Hague Rules liability scheme 
for cargo damage due to the operation of the Clause Paramount, that he would not have been 
exposed under the charter. Thus, both Clause Paramount and rider clause altered the indemni-
ty regime in the charter, and the Court decided to exit the problem analyzing the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. This made the Clause 
Paramount/rider clause part of the overall bargain in the charter. In other words the Clause 
Paramount would necessarily expose the shipowner to the Hague Rules liability regime to a 
bill of lading transferee. Thus, “[…] that must or should, have been obvious [for the Owner]. 
If the owners wanted an indemnity from the charterers in that eventuality, the obvious course 
was to ask for one.”91
In connection with The C. Joyce and The Vestkyst I type of cases, an appreciated academic
effort would be to follow closely new developments on this particular point on indemnities on 
voyage charters under English and Norwegian law. As stated above, the new amended Gen-
con contains an express indemnity in Clause 10 and bills of lading shall be issued using Con-
gebil form (a specific bill of lading that includes a Clause Paramount in Clause 2).92 This is a 
                                                
90 Trond Solvang, ‘Bills of lading issued under voyage charterparties: review of legal position 
under English and Scandinavian law – practical advice on how to secure shipowners’ right of 
indemnity from charterers for liabilities incurred under bills of lading’ in Nordisk Med-
lemsbladet (2003), p. 5962.
91 The C. Joyce [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 285.
92 Gencon 1994, Clause 10, lines 158-163 provides: “The Charterers shall indemnify the 
Owners against all consequences or liabilities that may arise from the signing of bills of lad-
ing to the extent that the terms or contents of such bills of lading impose or result in the impo-
sition of more onerous liabilities upon the Owners than those assumed by the Owners under 
this Charterparty.”
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question that remains open to new elaborations under both jurisdictions. Thus, new develop-
ments may confirm or override what was decided in The C. Joyce and The Vestkyst I.
A relevant time charter case that dealt with bills of lading and indemnity is The Caroline P
“[…] in which a time charterer required the owner to sign bills of lading ‘as presented’.”93
The bills presented by the charterer left the owner with the responsibility for duties that the 
charterparty did not impose upon him, i.e. cargo stowage and discharge. If one makes a con-
trast with The C. Joyce, one will see that The Caroline P involved a much broader obligation 
of the shipowner because his master would sign bills of lading “as presented”, not considering
interaction specifically with any Clause Paramount/rider clause.94 Also, as referred, in The C.
Joyce the exposure to the Hague Rules was foreseeable for the owner. If a particular indemni-
ty was actually a term of the contract, the owner should have demanded it expressly during 
the contract negotiation. 
In The Caroline P the more general obligation upon the shipowner (to sign bills of lading “as 
presented”) did not seem to make all the consequences reasonably predictable for him at the 
time of entering into the contract, thus, granting the indemnity was consistent with the fore-
seeability element.
Furthermore, The Island Archon case was based on the following facts: During the charter 
period, the Island Archon carried cargo to Iraq. Once discharged, claims were made against 
the shipowner due to shortage and the owner was held liable. Consequently the owner looked 
for indemnity. However, the arbitrator dismissed the indemnity claim on a formal issue, due 
to the lack of inclusion of the indemnity in the shipowner’s plea. The owner appealed and 
looked for indemnity towards the charterer due to cargo claims before an English Court.95
                                                
93 [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 466; also see Foxton, p. 108.
94 The C. Joyce [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 285.
95 The Island Archon [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 227.
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References that the Court makes to English case law on bills of lading (at p. 402 et seq.) are 
illustrative and particularly interesting in cases of disparity between bills of lading and time 
charter terms.
Another interesting and recent case is The Ikariada. In this case indemnity was triggered due 
to an obligation of providing with a specified bill of lading for master’s signature. However, 
again another voyage charter case, it applies to time charters as a matter of principle. As per 
Davidson, the importance of this case is the following: (i) there should be no indemnity, if the 
terms of the bills of lading coincide with the terms required by the charter, i.e. an appropriate 
bill of lading; (ii) to determine the pertinence of the bill of lading, one has to look at the char-
ter; (iii) if bills of lading incorporate greater liability terms that is a matter of interpretation; 
(iv) if the master has the obligation of signing a bill of lading as presented, and he signs and 
the terms are more onerous to the shipowner, there may be an implied indemnity situation; (v) 
the master is not obliged to sign bills of lading presented without fulfilling the specified 
form.96
As stated above, under English law, if there is an explicit and precise reference to an indemni-
ty in a charter, that is a term of the charter, one will be facing an express indemnity situation. 
If there is not such an express reference, there will be an implied indemnity. However, both 
are conditioned to the additional requirements of causation, remoteness, compliance with the 
charterer’s orders, specified form or not, for bills of lading.
In conclusion, English solutions on indemnity situations of discrepancy between bills of lad-
ing and charterparties are not radically different compared to solutions under Norwegian law. 
However English law differs when analyzing implied indemnities, based on compliance of 
charterer’s instructions and terms that may reasonably be implied in fact. 
                                                
96 Simon Davidson, Charterparty indemnities. 
<http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/charterparty-indemnities-1481/ > Accessed 
25.09.2013; The Ikariada [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 365.
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Next Chapter deals with practical considerations when drafting indemnity clauses in time 
charters under Norwegian law and conclusions.
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3 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Practical considerations
Some practical considerations at the time of drafting indemnities in time charters under 
Norwegian law would be to insert an express reference to indemnity for mandatory rules 
in order to avoid uncertainty.97 For example: (i) Under Shelltime Clause 13 (a) (i), lines 
145-148, the indemnity language would be as follows: “Charterers hereby indemnify 
Owners against all consequences or liabilities that may arise (i) from signing bills of lad-
ing in accordance with the directions of Charterers or their agents, to the extent that the 
terms of such bills of lading fail to conform to the requirements of this charter, or (except 
as provided in Clause 13 (b)) from the master otherwise complying with Charterers’ or 
their agents’ orders, or (notwithstanding as provided in Clause 38) against liabilities im-
posed to Owners due to application of mandatory rules”. [Emphasis added]; (ii) Under 
Baltime Clause 9, lines 123-128, the wording may be the following: “The Charterers shall 
indemnify the Owners against all consequences or liabilities arising from the Master, of-
ficers or Agents signing Bills of Lading or other documents or otherwise complying with 
such orders, as well as from any irregularity in the Vessel’s papers or for overcarrying 
goods, or against liabilities imposed to Owners due to application of mandatory rules.”
[Emphasis added] (iii) Under NY Produce Clause 30 (b), lines 311-314: “All bills of lad-
ing or waybills shall be without prejudice to this Charterparty and the Charterers shall 
indemnify the Owners against all consequences or liabilities which may arise from any 
inconsistency between this charterparty and any bills of lading or waybills signed by the 
Charterers or by the master at their request, or (notwithstanding as provided in Clause 31 
                                               
97 Professor Trond Solvang suggested some draft examples for voyage charter indemnities 
on how to secure shipowners’ right of indemnity against charterers for liabilities incurred 
under bills of lading. His view has been expressed in the article ‘Bills of lading issued 
under voyage charterparties: review of legal position under English and Scandinavian law 
– practical advice on how to secure shipowners’ right of indemnity from charterers for 
liabilities incurred under bills of lading’ in Nordisk Medlemsbladet (2003), p. 5966.
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(a)) against liabilities imposed to Owners due to application of mandatory rules” [Em-
phasis added]
3.2 Conclusions
As for the answer to the first question presented in part 1.1 of this dissertation, i.e. “How 
indemnities have been understood, in time charters, under Norwegian and English law?” 
Norwegian and English understandings do match in fact on how indemnities are concep-
tualized in time charters. However, legal bases differ probably due to characteristics of 
their legal systems. Within both jurisdictions, indemnities have the same purpose, i.e. to 
restore the allocation of risk balance under the charter. 
As for the answer to the second query, “Whether or not solutions on indemnities in time 
charters would be similar in Norway and England, in situations where the shipowner in-
curs greater liability for bills of lading inconsistent with charterparty terms”, Norwegian 
and English law are different. 
When it comes to analyzing terms in bills of lading under Norwegian law, one has to con-
sider: (i) if bill of lading terms “impose liability in excess” of the charter terms, pursuant 
to Sections 382 (cf. 338); (ii) and, the operation of mandatory rules (under Chapter 13 of 
the Maritime Code), which may restrict owner’s indemnity recourse. 
Under English law the latter questions are conceptualized as follows: (i) bills of lading 
disparity is a pure problem of construction of the bills of lading terms under the charter-
party (not under the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act);98 (ii) one has to distinguish 
                                               
98 Generally, charterparties referred to in this dissertation have been drafted to be subject 
to English law. Norwegian law, in some cases can construe clauses differently. This prob-
lem has been very well explained in The Arica arbitration award, ND 1983.309 (The Ari-
ca), a Texacotime case, on the interpretation of an off-hire clause. For English translation 
of The Arica, see Maritime Law Case Collection (JUS 5401/5402), Maritime Law, Nor-
disk Institutt for Sjørett, Sjørettsfondet, 2001, p. 46. Thus, one can see the impact that 
other legislation may have on said indemnity recourses meant to be governed by English 
law (cf. Section 338, 382 of the Norwegian Maritime Code plus preparatory works). 
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between bills of lading “as presented” and “required in a specified form” (as per The Ika-
riada); (iii) implied indemnities are implied terms in fact and in particular in the time 
charter context these are based on the observation charterer’s orders; (iv) considerations of 
causation and foreseeability will be relevant as well. 
As said above, in Norway implied indemnities are based on statutory provisions (Section 
338 and 382) that clearly state that remedy maybe required if certain circumstances are 
fulfilled, e.g. bills of lading with different terms as those in the charterparty (as per The
Vestkyst I). The deficiency of this approach is based on the lack distinctions and on the 
lack of explanation regarding the object and content of mandatory rules that The Vestkyst I
case created and that the 1993 Maritime Law Committee picked-up. One may wonder if 
that was the intended definite solution that the drafters of the 1994 Code had in mind for 
time charters. 
In addition, as per prof. arbitrator Brækhus in The Jobst Oldendorff arbitration award,
general Norwegian contract law may be a suitable general basis for indemnity. One may 
agree or not with the more general approach, but the particular doctrine developed by his 
award on the “functions/duties” of the parties may assist when understanding time charter 
implied indemnities subject to Norwegian law.99
As said, in England, implied indemnities have been understood as a broader right to claim 
for liabilities incurred when obeying charterers’ orders. Furthermore, the other basis 
would be represented by the implied indemnity of the shipowner founded on a line of 
common law cases that recognizes a right to claim for indemnity for losses in the absence 
of express terms, but which requires other conditions, as we have seen (Dugdale v Lover-
ing and Moel Tryvan). Terms implied in fact are subject to two tests, the business efficacy 
test or the officious by-stander test (a fly on the wall).100
                                                                                                                                               
99 Cf. Section 381, third paragraph. 
100 Jill Poole, Contract Law, (11th edn, Oxford 2012), p. 209, expressed that implied terms 
under English law are terms not expressed in the contract, however courts recognize these 
terms in order “[…] to fill gaps on the basis of giving effect to the deemed intentions of 
the parties and/or on the basis of ‘necessity’.” Implied terms may be implied in custom or 
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However, as elaborated, both English and Norwegian systems have developed their par-
ticular legal devices to solve the issue of implied indemnities in time charters in order to
guarantee their workability.   
Finally, from a lex ferenda perspective, two essential aspects need to be provided with a 
legislative or judicial response in Norway: (i) whether indemnity claims in the context of 
time charters due to issuance of bills of lading with discrepancies would be subject to The 
Vestkyst I test (with the mandatory rules exception included) and why; and (ii) what would 
be the solution when the charterer does not incarnate a cargo interest and there is an ex-
press indemnity in the contract.
                                                                                                                                               
usage as per Hutton v Warren (1836) 1 M & W 466, implied in fact, implied in law; see 
also The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64; Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd 
[2009] UKPC 10, [2009] Bus LR 1316, 1 WLR 1988; Mediterranean Salvage Towage 
and Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading and Commerce Inc., The Reborn [2009] EWCA Civ 
531, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2009] 1 CLC 909. Furthermore, terms implied in fact 
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